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Abstract 
This paper investigates the factor markets, namely, the land, 
labor, and credit markets in China's rural areas after the 
household responsibility system reform. It is found that the 
institution of the household-based farming system created an 
allocative inefficiency and the factor markets are a necessary 
mechanism for improving the resource allocation in rural areas. 
Most restrictions on the functioning of factor markets have been 
removed; however, the existences of factor markets are still very 
limited. As the extent of land market and labor market crucially 
depends on the extent of credit market, the limited transactions in 
the land and labor markets should be explained by the 
underdevelopment of credit market, which may be due to the fact 
that lenders' rights are not protected. In order to facilitate 
factor market transactions, the Chinese government may have to 
change its position on the lenders'-rights. 
Rural Factor Markets in China 
After the Household Responsibility System Refor~ 
Justin Yifu Lin 
Yale University 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a study of rural factor markets in China. 
Transactions in factor markets were severely constrained by government 
policies in the past. Recent reforms in rural areas, however, have 
brought exchanges in factors to life again. 
Traditionally, Chinese peasants, like their contemporaries in 
other Asian countries, were not unfamiliar with factor markets. In 
fact, a whole spectrum of market exchanges in land, labor, and credit 
existed in complex forms in rural China before the socialist 
revolution. 1 Nevertheless, the cooperative movement, starting in the 
195Os, collectivized land, labor, and other resources and made market 
exchanges in land and labor between households impossible. Private 
credit exchanges were also severely limited. Rent and interest were 
taken as means of capitalist exploitation and the labor force was not 
to be treated as a commodity that could be bought or sold; therefore, 
market exchanges between two collective farming units were also 
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prohibited. 
Under the collective system, a production team, usually 
consisting of about 30 neighboring households, was generally the basic 
unit of production and income distribution. The team was entitled to 
all factors of production. These factors were allocated under the 
unified management of a team leader with the exception of small 
private plots reserved for households' use in their spare time. 
Peasants, working under the supervision of a team leader, were 
credited with work points for a day's work that they had done. At the 
end of a year, net team income was first distributed among team 
members according to basic needs, then the rest was distributed 
according to the work points that each one had accumulated during the 
year. This institution was found to be very inadequate in providing 
work incentives to peasants in a production team. 2 
A new policy called the production responsibility system was 
introduced at the end of 1978 as one element of a package of reforms 
aiming at improving agricultural production in rural areas. 3 At first, 
this policy was designed to improve the management and incentive 
problems within a team. However, it developed into a specific form now 
called "the household responsibility system" that dissolved the 
production teams and restored individual households as units of 
agricultural production and accounting. The household responsibility 
system evolved into the main feature of the recent reforms in the 
Chinese rural areas. It is found that the shift from a production team 
system to the household responsibility system on the average increased 
the agricultural productivity about 20%. This jump in productivity 
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explained about 60% of the output growth in agricultural production 
between 1980 and 1983. 4 
The improvement in incentive, nevertheless, may have 
simultaneously created allocative inefficiencies. When the household 
responsibility system was introduced, land and other resources in a 
team were in most cases allotted to each household in proportion to 
its size. Therefore, for the households in a team, their land-person 
ratio was equalized after the household responsibility reform. 
Households are at different stages in the life cycle. They thus have 
different endowments of family labor. In addition, households differ 
in abilities. An equal land-person ratio across households in a team 
thus does not fully equalize land-labor ratio across households. If 
each household faces the same production function, this egalitarian 
allocation of land will result in disparities in the marginal products 
of land and labor across households. 5 These differences in marginal 
products represent an allocative inefficiency. Output can be increased 
if resources are reallocated. 
One possible way to take advantage of these opportunities is 
through direct government intervention, like land-reallocation among 
households. Nevertheless, government intervention can be ruled out as 
an alternative for the near future. When the household responsibility 
system was first introduced, the land contracts in general ranged from 
1 to 3 years. When an original contract expired, land was reassigned 
and adjusted according to changes in household size and labor 
endowment. This practice was soon found to be impractical. As land 
might be assigned away in next contract, each household thus lacked 
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incentives to invest in land improvement and to maintain properly the 
soil fertility. To overcome this disincentive in land investment and 
land maintenance, the Chinese government has adopted a policy of 
lengthening the contract of land usage to each household for up to 15 
years or longer. 
The other possibility for improving allocative efficiency is 
through market transactions. Market transactions can range from hired 
labor to land tenancy or may be packaged in complex contracts 
involving several transactions in different markets. Transactions in 
land and labor naturally will give rise to demand for credit. If 
factor transactions are costless, certain, unconstrained, and 
enforceable, then marginal products will be brought into equality by 
market transactions. However, as discussed by Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig, factor transactions in rural areas are characterized by 
risk and beset with incentive problems. 6 The existence of well 
developed rural factor markets cannot, therefore, be taken for 
granted. This paper is devoted to examining the extent and possible 
developments in rural factor markets in China. 
Before going into any detailed discussions, three specific 
features that characterize China's rural factor markets need to be 
mentioned: 
a) The rural reform in China has gone through the first stage, 
which featured the individual household responsibility system. By the 
end of 1983, 94.5% of rural households in China had adopted this new 
system. 7 The Chinese government launched a second-stage reform in 
1984. The main theme of the second-stage reform is to transform a 
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self-subsistence economy into a commodity production and exchange 
economy by way of readjusting the production structure in rural areas 
through market mechanisms. When the household responsibility system 
was first introduced, hiring labor, subleasing land, and lending money 
at high interest rates were all explicitly prohibited. 8 Since then 
there have been substantial changes. The first change came to the 
credit market. Private credit with a high interest rate is no longer 
categorically classified as usury in the 79th document issued by the 
State Council in 1981. Leasing out land to other farmers and hiring 
workers within a limited number (less than eight) were also formally 
sanctioned in Document No. 1, issued by the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China in 1984. Transactions in factor markets have 
been legalized. However, socialist sentiment is still deeply rooted in 
China. It appears unlikely, for example, that the government will 
force a person to be evicted from his house if he uses it as 
collateral and fails to repay his loan. It is also unimaginable that 
public opinion will sympathize with the lender in the case of a 
default. 
b) There is a commonly held belief in China that at least 30% of 
the labor force in rural areas is surplus labor. The argument is that 
the cultivated land per capita in 1949 was 2.7 mu and now it has 
shrunk to about 1.6 mu. However, the percentage of labor force remains 
in rural areas has been about the same during this period. If the 
surplus labor is defined as the labor force that can be removed from 
agricultural work in the peak period without reducing agricultural 
output, the accuracy of this belief is very doubtful. There have been 
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tremendous investment in land improvement. The usages of chemical 
fertilizers and other modern inputs have also increased greatly. It is 
hard to imagine that the marginal productivity of labor in the Chinese 
rural areas could be zero or negative in the peak period. A more 
accurate way of expressing the situation would be that, under the 
current price system and the average operational landholding, the 
value of marginal product of labor in agriculture, especially in 
cropping, is much lower than that in non-agricultural sectors; 
therefore, there is a general tendency for the rural labor force to 
shift out of agricultural sector. A study shows that the average net 
income per worker in the suburbs of Shanghai in 1981 was Y 441 for 
agriculture, Y 1,003 for sideline production, and Y 1,625 for 
industry. 9 The differences in incomes across sectors should also be 
similar in other regions. This income differential will thus induce a 
tendency for the labor force to move out of the agricultural sector. 
c) The original production teams are still entitled to the 
ownership of land after implementing the household responsibility 
system. However, the use right of land is assigned to individual 
households for a period of 15 years or more. This practice created a 
situation very similar to the distinction between "topsoil right" and 
"subsoil right." The "subsoil right" represented the usual, original 
claim to land ownership, including the right of sale, but excluding 
the right of cultivation. The "topsoil right" was the right to 
cultivate a piece of land, which could also be leased or sold. Hence, 
in fact, two distinct rents, one for the subsoil right and the other 
for the topsoil right, were involved.lo The entitlement to a use right 
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of land for 15 years, therefore, is a sufficient condition for land 
market transactions. 
II. LAND ALLOCATION AND LAND MARKET 
The differences in the marginal products of land and labor in 
China have two major sources. One is the differences in land endowment 
across regions. The other one is the egalitarian distribution of land 
after the household responsibility reform. 
Table lA shows that the eight provinces that have the lowest 
land-labor ratio possessed 39.6% of the total labor force in China in 
1983; however, they only had 21.4% of the total cultivated land. On 
the contrary, the 9 land-rich provinces possessed only 10.5% of the 
total labor force but were endowed 34.1% of the total cultivated land. 
The peasants in land-rich Helongjiang Province on the average had 
about 17 times as much land as the peasants in land-poor Zheijiang 
Province. Not only is the distribution of cultivated land unequal 
among provinces, but it is also unequal within a province. Table lB 
shows that, in Anhui Province in 1983, 31.8% of cultivated land 
located in nine prefectures that had 22.9% of labor force. In 
contrast, the six prefectures that had the lowest land-labor ratio had 
21.7% of the labor force but only 13.6% of the cultivated land. 
Although the differences within Anhui Province are not as large as the 
differences among provinces, the disparities are still quite 
substantial. The peasants in Huaibeishi have 3.6 time as much land as 
the peasants in Anqingshi. The differences in land-labor ratio reduce 
after adjusting for irrigation (proxy for land quality) and multiple 
cropping (proxy for climate and temperature). However, the differences 
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are still very substantial as the last columns of tables lA and lB 
suggest. Although, without empirical studies, it is difficult to say 
to what degree land endowments differ across neighboring production 
teams, the difference itself can be taken as a fact. The distribution 
of inherited intelligence of a large population approaches normal in 
any large sample. There is no a priori reason to believe that the 
average quality of the labor forces in two neighboring teams, which 
both have about 100 workers, would be significantly different. 11 It 
thus should not be too unrealistic to assume that the quality of labor 
forces across teams and regions is the same. Consequently, much of the 
differences in the land-labor ratio represent an allocative 
inefficiency. 
Allocative inefficiency within a team, however, would arise from 
an opposite reason. Under the production team system, the team-owned 
land was divided into collectively farmed plots and private plots. 
Private plots were allotted to each household according to its size. 
The land that could be allotted for private plots varied from time to 
time. The average amount of land in private plots nationally was 5.7% 
in 1978. It rose to 7.1% in 1980. 12 After the introduction of the 
household responsibility system, the collectively farmed land was 
contracted to individual households in two different categories. One 
was the "food ration plot." The other one was the "responsibility 
plot." The difference between these two kinds of plots was that a 
household had to pay only state tax on the food ration plot, but it 
also had to pay the public accumulation fund, public welfare fund, and 
other duties to its team on the responsibility plots. As for the 
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private plot, the state tax was also waived. Two different practices 
were used to contract the collectively owned land. The first practice 
contracted the land strictly in proportion to the size of each 
household. The second one took into account both the size and the 
labor force of each household. However, the results of these two 
practices may not be very different. A survey of a production team in 
Guangxi Province found that the household with the largest labor force 
only had 0.16 mu per capita more than the average of the team, and the 
household with the smallest labor force had only 0.078 mu per capita 
less than the average of the team, even though 70% of weight was given 
to the labor force in the contracts. 13 Therefore, it can be assumed 
that the land-person ratio across households in a team is roughly 
equal no matter what practice has actually been adopted. Not only is 
the quantity of land per capita equal across households, but the 
quality of land owned by each person in a team is also the same. This 
is because land was first graded according to its quality, then each 
person received a piece of land from each grade. Therefore, each 
household in China after the individual household reform often owns 
more than 10 strips of land. 14 Households in a team are at different 
stages of their life cycles and thus have different labor endowments. 
They also have different level of education, experience, and other 
abilities. As a consequence, the equal land-person ratio across 
households in a team generates a potential allocative inefficiency. A 
survey of 235 households in a village in Sichuan Province found that 
25% of households with a rich labor endowment did not have enough land 
to farm; 6% of households did not have enough labor to work on their 
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land; and 4.7% of households were good at other trades, so they did 
not want to work on their land. 15 
Land transactions in China's rural areas after the household 
responsibility reform are restricted in their form of lease. The 
government has encouraged the households specialized in cropping to 
consolidate their landholding. 16 Table 2 summarizes several studies 
concerning the extent of land transactions in certain regions in 
China. Rows 1-3 are based on the surveys done at the end of 1983 and 
rows 4-5 are based on the data collected at the end of 1984. Column 2 
is the percentage of households in an area that either leased out 
their land to other households or returned their land to their 
production teams. The land returned to a production team may be 
recontracted to other households. Column 3 shows the percentage of 
land in an area that was involved in land transactions. The percentage 
of land involved is less than the percentage of households involved. 
This is due to the fact that most households only leased out or 
returned their responsibility plots and kept their food ration plots 
and private plots. 
All these studies found that land transactions were more active 
in areas closer to cities. Tianjin is the third largest city in 
China. But even by the end of 1984, only 8.3% of land was 
transacted in Tianjin; therefore, land transactions in China as a 
whole must have existed with only a very limited scope up to now. 
These studies also found that the majority of households that 
leased out or returned their land were "specialized households" that 
engaged in noncrop jobs, such as transportation, repairing, food 
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processing, other services, or fish-, poultry-, and pig-raising. Only 
a very small portion of households leased out or returned their land 
because of lack of labor endowment. From the supply side, we find that 
the scope of land transactions crucially depends on the job 
opportunities outside cropping. 
Although the extent of land transactions is very limited, the 
forms it takes are more extensive. They can be classified into two 
basic forms: (a) without compensation or (b) with compensation. 
In the first case, households either give their land back to 
production teams or give it to their relatives or close friends. In 
either situation, households still maintain their claim over the use 
right to the land. They can take it back in the future if they desire. 
Rent over use right is positive (see the discussion later). Households 
voluntarily give up the rent entitled to them. This fact implies that 
(1) the land market in these places must not have existed, so the 
households that want to migrate out of agriculture could not find 
other households to lease it and (2) that the labor market or the 
credit market had also failed, so the households could not find 
workers to farm their land or did not have enough cash to hire 
workers. 
For the cases with compensation, there are two main varieties: 
(1) rental and (2) sharecrop. Fan reported that in Fujian Province 
there were three ways in which rent was paid. 17 In one case the 
households that leased out land were guaranteed the right to purchase 
a certain amount of food grain at the government procurement price. 
Because the government procurement price was lower than the market 
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price at the local fair, the difference between these two prices 
became rent. Fan found that rent paid in this way was equivalent to Y 
64.86 per mu. In the other case, the households were compensated with 
a given amount of free grain, ranging between 200-300 jin of grain. 
Fan found that the market value of it was about Y 60 per mu. In still 
another case, rent was paid in cash at also about Y 60 per mu. In all 
these cases the rent was about 30% of the gross value of output. Fan 
also reported a case of sharecropping. A bee-raising specialized 
household leased out its land of 5.2 mu and lent Y 300 to the renter 
for the cost of seeds and fertilizer. The renter harvested 5,600 jin 
of rice. For the required quota, 1900 jin were sold for Y 320 to the 
government. This money was paid back to the landholder for the Y 300 
loan. The rest of the 5,600 jin were equally shared by the landholder 
and the renter. The rent amounted to Y 129.27 per mu according to the 
market value of rice at the local fair. In the other study of a county 
in Zhejiang Province, Zhou and Du found that fixed rent was paid in 
two ways. 18 The rent was equivalent to Y 57.7 per mu when a household 
was guaranteed the right to purchase a certain amount of grain at the 
government procurement price. It was about Y 52.5 per mu at the local 
fair price for rent in the fixed amount of free grain. The rent was 
also roughly about 30% of the gross value of output. Zhou and Du found 
that there was a tendency to use the rent in the fixed amount of free 
grain. They also recorded a case that a household hired casual workers 
to farm its land. The net income per mu for the landholder in this 
case was Y 77.97. That was about 30% higher than the prevailing rent. 
There are several interesting relations in these cases: 
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a) Rent in cash was a little bit lower than rent in kind. This 
may be explained by the facts that cash is preferred because of its 
general purchasing power and that the price for grain at local fairs 
may fluctuate, so there is some risk inherent in rent in kind. 
b) Among the rent in kind, the rent was lower if it was paid by a 
fixed amount of free grain than if it was paid by a fixed amount of 
grain at the government procurement price. This again may be due to 
the fact that the landholder has to face larger risk because of the 
possibility of price fluctuation at the local fair. 
c) The return to land was higher for a landholder if he hired 
workers to farm it instead of leasing it. This can be explained by the 
fact that a landholder has to face the risks arising from production 
and market fluctuations and that he also contributes his 
entrepreneurship to production. 
d) The land market is tied with the credit market in the case of 
sharecropping, as reported above. The return from leasing to the 
landholder depends on how the interest rate is calculated. In Chinese 
rural areas the interest rate is extremely high for private credit. It 
ranges between 4%-10% per month or even higher. Because the interest 
of the loan to the renter was not explicitly paid, after deducting the 
implicit market interest rate, the rent for the sharecropping case was 
not as high as it appeared to be. 
All the above relations are expected from the standard economic 
theory. 
In the Chinese rural land market, a long term lease with advanced 
payment of the present value of all rent for the use right of land for 
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15 years has not been found. For a household leaving agriculture to 
establish a noncrop business, this kind of transaction should be 
attractive. It is a good way to overcome the possible cash constraint 
for starting a business. The lack of such transaction can only be 
understood from the demand side. There are two possible explanations. 
One is that land cannot be used as a collateral because the government 
will not enforce a lender's right by helping him repossess the land in 
case of default. In general, the cash-rich households in China are 
households specialized in non-crop activities. From the above 
discussions, we find that they are the households that would like to 
leave their land. The households that will like to expand their 
landholding are, in general, those households that stay in the crop 
sector. They are more likely to be cash-poor. Therefore, unless they 
can borrow from a credit market, they will not be able to finance land 
buying. Credit markets will be limited if land cannot be used as 
collateral. 19 Therefore, a cash-poor household will not be able to 
finance the transaction if they cannot use the purchased land as 
collateral. The other explanation is that the government will not 
protect such kind of contract, if the leasing household fails in 
nonfarm undertaking and tries to take its land back. Therefore, even a 
household is not constrained by cash requirement, it may be still 
reluctant to expand its landholding through such kind of transaction. 
III. RURAL LABOR MARKETS 
Transactions in labor are another way to equalize differences in 
marginal products across regions and households. Labor-hiring was 
prohibited before the recent reform. When labor transactions are 
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prohibited, migration between teams and across regions can be another 
way to bring marginal products into equality. However, as rent was 
suppressed in a collective system, workers were compensated with the 
average net product instead of the marginal product. Consequently, a 
portion of their income actually was rent. Workers in a team with a 
lower average income certainly have the incentives to migrate to a 
team with a higher average income. They would be able to receive the 
same higher average income as the original members in the higher­
income team. Nevertheless, the workers in a higher-income team would 
be reluctant to accept migrants from other teams for fear that their 
rent would be shared by the newcomers. 20 Therefore, when payment of 
marginal product to workers was prohibited, the migration between 
production teams or across regions was virtually nonexistent. 
When the household responsibility system was first introduced, 
hired labor was explicitly prohibited on the grounds that exploitation 
of the surplus value was not allowed to be restored. 21 Nevertheless, 
labor-hiring can be mutually profitable for both the employers and 
employees. With such underlying incentives, it is difficult to enforce 
the decree. As more and more cases of hired labor appeared and the 
government realized labor transactions were beneficial for the economy 
as a whole, the policy was revised to allow hiring labor. Yet a 
household is limited to hiring not more than eight workers. The limit 
of eight workers is chosen because once Marx wrote in Capital that a 
person who hired less than eight workers could not be classified as a 
capitalist, as he still had to attend to the physical work himself. 
The arbitrarily set limit has never been strictly abided by. Some 
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households in rural areas have hired more than 100 permanent 
workers. 22 While the upper limit of eight workers is still officially 
maintained, the government does not seem to enforce it. 23 
The opening of labor markets makes the equalization of marginal 
products across households possible by way of labor transactions. What 
is of interest is to what extent the difference in marginal products 
has been narrowed. A survey of labor-hiring in Wu County, Jiangsu 
Province, found that more than 50% of the labor hired was used in 
nonagricultural work (see Table 3). In Wu County the majority of labor 
were hired for civil engineering or manufacturing. The major impact of 
opening labor markets in Wu County is thus the increase in job 
opportunities within the non-farm sector. Another survey of labor 
hired in Yangshi County, Shenyangshi, Liaoning Province has the same 
finding (see table 3). The impact of labor-hiring on narrowing the 
differences in marginal productivity across households is ambiguous 
for the workers hired for non-farm jobs. Non-farm jobs often require 
special talents; hence, from the supply side, the labor working for 
non-agricultural jobs is not necessarily coming from households with 
more labor endowment. However, from the demand for agricultural 
workers, three kinds of households may hire workers: (a) households 
specializing in stock-raising, fish-raising, or vegetable cultivation; 
(b) households renting large amount of land; (c) households keeping 
some of their labor force at homes for farming but having shifted the 
major part of their labor force out of agriculture. The first two 
categories indicate that the labor-hiring households have superior 
technology or entrepreneurship in agricultural productions. The last 
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one indicates that the remaining labor endowments in the labor-hiring 
households must be less than the average. Therefore, from the demand 
side, transactions in labor market tend to reduce the differences in 
marginal products across households. 
The first two categories of households usually hire workers on a 
monthly or yearly basis. Zhang Songmao reported that a household in Wu 
County rented 430 mu of land from its own and neighboring counties and 
employed 18 workers for producing grain, watermelon, soybeans, and so 
on. It also raised 550 chickens and ducks. The head of this household 
was formerly a production team leader. 24 Zhou found that a household 
in Hainan, Guangdong Province, rented a 300-mu sugarcane plantation 
and hired 20 workers to run it. 25 The last category of households 
usually hire casual workers either by piece rate or day rate. The wage 
rate for a permanently hired worker was about Y 1000 per year in both 
Zhang's and Zhou's studies. For the casual workers, Zhou and Du found 
that the wage rate was about Y 5 per day in the peak period and about 
Y 4 per day in the off-peak period in 1983 in Zhejiang Province. 26 Shi 
found that the piece rate in the suburbs of Shanghai in 1979 was Y 15 
to Y 17 for transplanting a mu of rice-seedlings. It was equivalent to 
Y 2.5 to Y 2.8 per day.27 
As discussed before, it was uncommon for a production team to be 
willing to accept a migrant from the other teams or from the other 
regions before the transactions in labor were legalized. Therefore, 
another natural impact of opening labor markets was the migration of 
labor across regions. A study found that by 1984 over 1,000 workers 
had been employed permanently from other provinces to work in the 
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suburbs of Shanghai. Some of them worked in the village-run 
industries. However, a substantial portion of them worked in vegetable 
gardening, duck-raising and chicken-raising. A brigade was found to 
have hired 85 migrant workers in 1984, it had planned to hire 50 more 
in 1985. The migrant workers would consist of 56% of the labor force 
in this brigade by 1985.28 
Labor markets in China's rural areas are still very limited. 29 
Furthermore, only a portion of labor hired in rural areas is actually 
engaging in agricultural work. From the characteristics of households 
that hire workers for agricultural work, we find that none of them are 
households with the least family labor endowment before any market 
transactions. From my observations, most households with the least 
labor endowments solve their problem by growing crops with different 
harvest periods, so the demand for labor at each peak period is 
mitigated. If there are still shortages of labor in some period, they 
engage in direct labor exchange with either neighboring households or 
relatives and friends. The reason for this may be that hired labor is 
subjected to incentive problems. The direct exchanges of labor between 
relatives and friends mitigate the shirking problem and thus reduce 
the cost of supervision. The other explanation is that hiring labor 
requires cash. Only households with good access to credit markets or 
high cash income have the ability to hire workers. As credit markets 
in rural areas are not developed, households with the least labor 
endowments will not have good access to credit markets. They are 
obviously not households with high cash incomes. Therefore, households 
with the least labor endowments may be unable to finance labor-hiring 
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because of the cash constraint. 
IV. RURAL CREDIT MARKET 
In the above two sections, it is found that the limited extent of 
rural land and labor markets may be closely related to the limited 
rural credit markets. The subsequent discussions focus on the extent 
and constraints of credit markets in Chinese rural areas. 
In a socialist society, there is a strong sentiment against the 
taking of interest. In Marx's teaching, interest in a capitalist 
society is a redistribution of the exploited surplus value between 
financial capitalists and industrial capitalists. However, the 
seasonality of agricultural production gives rise to seasonal needs 
for funds to bridge gaps between receipts and expenditures. Both 
formal and informal credit markets existed in rural areas even before 
the household responsibility system reform (see the discussions 
followed). 
There are no private financial institutions in China. Formal 
credits are provided by the Chinese Agricultural Bank and credit 
cooperatives. The Chinese Agricultural Bank is a state bank. It has 
branches in every commune. Credit cooperatives are formally owned by 
commune members. However, credit cooperatives in the past, in reality, 
acted as branches of the Agricultural Bank. In many areas, the 
Agricultural Bank and credit cooperatives shared the same offices and 
had the same staff. 30 The credits were provided at subsidized interest 
rates in the past. The interest rate charged for a loan was 0.25% per 
month until 1981. However, the average interest rate for deposit was 
0.312% in 1980. The government in Shanxi Province thus had to 
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subsidize Y 11.5 million for the Agriculture Bank and the credit 
cooperatives in 1980 alone. 31 Not only were the interest rates charged 
low, but loans were often provided without consideration of their 
prospects of recovery. For example, in Shanxi Province, only 84.6% of 
loans between 1976 and 1979 were paid back. 32 The situation was not 
better in the other provinces. According to national statistics, Y 4 
billion of bad agricultural loans were cancelled in 1961 and another Y 
8 billion of bad loans were accumulated between 1962 and 1980. 33 The 
availability of credit was thus severely limited. A survey of several 
counties in Henan Province found that, due to poor recovery, each 
county had only about Y 2 millions for new loans although each of them 
were officially allotted more than Y 10 millions for agricultural 
loans. 34 
The results of low interest rates and low pressure for repayment 
are not hard to figure out. Credits were not used with care. For 
example, in Linfen county, Shanxi Province, Y 140,000 of agricultural 
loans from credit cooperatives before 1978 were not used properly. 
Among these loans of Y 140,000, Y 100,000 were used on construction 
that had never been completed; Y 20,000 were expended on unusable 
materials; and Y 20,000 were wasted on administrative expenditures. 35 
The other result is credit rationing. As interest rates were low and 
pressures for repayment were not strong, real opportunity costs for 
using credits were close to zero or even negative. Therefore, the 
demand for credits was definitely higher than the supply of credits. 
The market could thus not possibly be cleared without non-market 
measures. The criterion for rationing varied from time to time. 
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Sometimes the priority was to help poor teams. At other times the 
priority was given to rich teams that had better uses for the funds. 36 
However, it was often found that a county leader used ad-hoc criteria 
in deciding who should be given a loan. 37 
The availability of formal credit declined because of the 
accumulation of bad debts and because of the unwillingness for people 
to deposit in credit cooperatives. 38 However, the demand for credits 
increased sharply. Taking Gansu Province as an example, total 
agricultural income increased 107% between 1956 and 1979, yet 
production expenditures increased 278%. In 1956, expenditures 
consisted of 21% of gross income, it increased to 39.2% in 1979. The 
situation in other provinces was no better. Statistics involving 3.6 
million production teams in 26 provinces, provided by the Agricultural 
Bank, showed that in 1980, on the average a production team had only 
15% of the required working funds. Another survey showed that about 
40% of the production teams in China did not have any working funds at 
all. Since formal credits could not satisfy the need for working 
funds, many production teams had to rely on private credits. The same 
report showed that in some regions as much as 70% of the production 
teams engaged in informal credit markets. 39 The interest rates paid 
for private credit were extremely high in some areas. One such case 
was recorded in a study of Dancheng County, Henan Province. The study 
found that the combined revenues for production teams was Y 21.76 
million between January and September 1979, yet the expenditure was Y 
36.33 million. Half of the deficit was financed by loans from the 
Agricultural Bank and credit cooperatives. The other half was borrowed 
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form private sources. Seventy percent of the credit borrowed from 
private sources was used to purchase fertilizer, 20% was used to buy 
livestock, the remaining 10% was paid for administrative expenditures. 
The interest rates ranged from 3% per month to 30% per month. On the 
average, it was 10% per month. 40 Zhang in another study, however, 
showed that the interest rates only ranged between 2-5% per month. 41 
Private credits were mainly provided by members in the borrowing 
production team. Among the 256 people lending money to a production 
team in Miluo County, Hunan Province, Zhang found that 235 were 
members of this team, 18 were cadres and government staff (not team 
members), and 3 were urban residents. 
Before the household responsibility reform, the majority of 
credits from the Agricultural Bank and credit cooperatives were given 
to production teams. Borrowing and lending between individual 
households were also rare. A study found that of the Y 3.03 million 
private credit in Xingmin County, Liaoning Province, January through 
May 1980, 1.3% was between state firms and production teams, 3.3% was 
among different production teams, 93.7% was between production teams 
and individual households, and only 1.7% was among different 
individual households.42 
The individual household responsibility reform brought dramatic 
changes in rural credit markets. In the production team system, an 
individual household would not need credit for production purposes. If 
a household had emergency needs for consumption, health, marriage, and 
so forth, its production team was more or less obliged to take care of 
them. The loans from a production team to individual households, in 
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general, were interest free and were not required to be paid back 
until the households were able to do so. The household responsibility 
system restored the individual household as the basic unit of 
production and accounting. It also eliminated the group insurance 
provided by the production team system. Therefore, individual 
households became the primary actors both in formal and informal 
credit markets. For the nation as a whole, among the Y 16.6 billion 
loans from credit cooperatives in 1983, 46% were given to individual 
households. The figure was only 19.6% in 1980. 43 The actual new 
credits to individual households should be higher than this figure 
suggests because many of the loans to the collectives were old loans 
that had not been repaid. 
The other new feature in rural credit markets after the household 
responsibility reform is the sharp rise of the amount of cash in 
circulation. This is partly because of a marked price rise for 
government-purchased agricultural products in 1979 and partly because 
of remarkable output growth since 1978. This feature is reflected in 
the dramatic increase in deposits in credit cooperatives. The deposits 
in credit cooperatives by individual households were Y 7.8 billion at 
the end of 1979. This figure rose to Y 32.0 billion at the end of 
1983. Most of the increased deposits were redeposited in the 
Agricultural Bank as reserve. Between 1978 and 1983, deposits in the 
credit cooperatives increased by Y 6.46 billion annually, however, 
loans from credit cooperatives increased only by Y 2.42 billion. It is 
suggested that the fact that loans increased by less than deposits was 
due to the inertia of credit cooperatives. 44 However, It may be due to 
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the fact that a local rural financial institution has to keep a high 
reserve ratio in order to prevent illiquidity. The seasonality of 
agricultural production leads to synchronic timing of deposits and 
withdrawals. Covariance of yield risk leads to covariance of default 
risk. Therefore, a local financial institution has to keep high 
reserve ratio to keep liquid.45 
As production expanded after the individual household 
responsibility reform, the demand for working funds also increased 
sharply. A survey of 21 households located at Xiachai Village, Ningdu 
County, Jiangxi Province, carried out by Mei46 found that per capita 
cash income was Y 59.25 in 1978 and Y 209.66 in 1983. Meanwhile, the 
total money borrowed in the sample was Y 415 in 1978 and Y 3,870 in 
1983. The weight of borrowed cash in total cash income was 7.4% in 
1978 compared with 20.5% in 1983. As the availability of formal credit 
was limited, private credit was the major source of rural credits. Mei 
reported that in Ganzhou Prefecture and Jiujiang Prefecture, both of 
Jiangxi Province, private credit was two time as much as the credit 
from the Agricultural Bank and credit cooperatives. Zhang Zhiping47 
making another survey of 20 households in two counties in Helongjiang 
Province, had the same findings. Zhang's survey is summarized in Table 
4. 
Zhang Zhiping also found that about 40% of private credit was 
used to buy draft animals, tractors, chemical fertilizer, and 
pesticides for grain production; about 50% was used for expanding cash 
crops, husbandry, and other production; and about 10% was used for 
repaying matured loans and for consumption. The terms of credit for 
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grain production in general did not exceed 10 months and for other 
production did not exceed 1 year. Private credit was obtained (a) from 
relatives or close friends; (b) from neighbors in the same village 
directly or through middlemen; and (c) from residents in other 
counties through middlemen. All private credits in rural areas 
depended on oral agreements. No explicit contracts were written. 
Furthermore, no collateral was found in private credit. The interest 
rates charged depended on the relationship between borrowers and 
lenders, creditworthiness of borrowers and middlemen, and the expected 
returns of investment. The rate was about 3% per month for loans 
between close friends and about 5% per month for others. 48 Mei, 
however, found that in some cases the interest rates were as high as 
10% or even 15% per month.49 
While a 3%-5% of interest rate per month for private, short-term 
agricultural production loans is not uncommon in other developing 
50countries and also before the revolution in China's rural areas, the 
interest rates were much higher for other types of private credit. Liu 
and Liang reported that the interest rates faced by private 
enterprises ranged between 4%-10% per month; some were even as high as 
20% per month. 51 In a society where high interest rates have been 
condemned for so long, it is an interesting phenomenon that private 
interest rates could be so high. 
A feature that merits special attention is that no collateral is 
found in private lending and borrowing in China's rural area. While 
the use of collateral is also not very often in informal rural credit 
markets in other developing countries, the nonexistence of collateral 
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at all is unusual. If collateral is used, the interest rate charged 
will be smaller because the risk of default declines as the value of 
collateral increases. The lack of collateral will also severely limit 
the extent of the credit market from both the supply side and the 
demand side. Lenders have to charge high interest because of the risk 
of default. However, the risk of default is a function of, among other 
things, the interest rate charged and the loan size. The expected gain 
for lenders may go down as the interest rate increases. Therefore, 
even though a borrower is willing to pay high interest rates, he may 
not be able to find someone to borrow from. From the demand side, the 
market may also disappear because the higher the interest rate is, the 
harder it is to find investment opportunities that have high enough 
expected returns. 52 Where loan sizes are large it would be beneficial 
for both borrowers and lenders to utilize collateral. In China's rural 
areas, there is no lack of private property that can theoretically be 
used as collateral. Houses are always privately owned. After 
implementing the individual household responsibility system, tractors, 
pumps, mills, trucks, draft animals, and livestock are also all owned 
by individual households. Furthermore, the use right of land that 
lasts 15 years or more is a property that could be traded and 
therefore serve as a collateral. The lack of collateral in China's 
rural credit markets can only be explained by the reluctance of 
lenders to accept it. 53 Although the interest charged for private 
credit is legalized in China, the ideology is still strongly 
unfavorable toward lenders. Public opinion will definitely sympathize 
with a borrower in the case of unintended default. The Chinese 
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government is not prepared to enforce lenders' rights by evicting the 
borrowers or assisting the lenders in repossessing the assets in the 
case of defaults. The absence of collateral in China's rural credit 
markets is consistent with Binswanger and Rosenzweig's thesis that the 
collateral value of an asset depends on the legal environment. 
Because of the lack of use of collateral, several forms of tied 
contracts appear in rural China, as in countries where suitable 
collateral do not exist. A landholder may provide credit to his tenant 
at a very low interest rate as part of a land contract, as mentioned 
in the discussion of land markets. A third party guarantee is also 
often seen when borrowers and lenders are not relatives or close 
friends. It is also found that some private enterprises require new 
employees to invest in the firms as a precondition for hiring. 54 
However, the most powerful guarantee for a lender in China's rural 
areas may be the threat of losing future borrowing opportunities when 
a borrower does not repay the loan. The rural population in China is 
relatively immobile. Information on default will be transmitted 
quickly to all potential lenders. Because insurance is absent in rural 
areas, access to credit provides an important substitute for 
insurance. Therefore, the loss of future borrowing opportunities is a 
very high cost for any borrower. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The household responsibility reform in China's rural areas has 
resulted in remarkable growth in agriculture. The success of the rural 
reform prompted the Chinese government to push the market-oriented 
reform to its urban economy. Meanwhile, the rural reform has also 
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reached the second-stage. The urban economy is much more complicated. 
Any policy, good or bad, will not manifest itself in a short period. A 
policy essential for the long run may even cause great difficulties in 
the short run. Therefore, whether the market-oriented reform in urban 
areas will be persistently carried out may again depend on the 
performance of the rural reform. The gain in incentive efficiency 
brought about by the household responsibility reform should have been 
exhausted. The potential for a sustained high growth rate in 
agriculture in the coming decade lies in improving allocative 
efficiency. Factor markets, namely, land markets, labor markets, and 
credit markets are important institutions for improving resource 
allocation. 
Most barriers for factor market transactions which existed before 
the household responsibility system reform have been cleared. Land can 
be leased out for rent. Interest can be charged for credit. Labor can 
be hired with a limitation that is not enforced. However, land, labor, 
and credit markets in rural China are still of a very limited extent. 
The main reason may be due to the fact that lender's right is not 
protected by the government; therefore, lenders have to charge high 
interest rates to offset the risks of default. 
On the one hand, the average landholding in China's rural areas, 
in general, will not produce an income comparable to the income from 
other sectors. Therefore, there is a general tendency for a household 
to shift out of agricultural sector, especially cropping. On the other 
hand, the egalitarian allotment of land after the household 
responsibility reform provides a safe shelter for every household. 
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Unless a household is secured with a job that produces an income 
higher than cropping, it will not render its land to the other 
households. Because there also exists a labor surplus in urban areas, 
it is almost impossible for rural labor to find jobs in state or 
collective enterprises in urban areas. Outmigration from cropping 
sector will be possible only if a rural household starts its own non­
cropping business, such as fish-raising, or nonfarm business, such as 
transportation, or finds a job in rural private enterprises that have 
emerged after recent reforms. Limited credit at very high interest 
rates will greatly reduce the possibility of profitable private 
businesses for households with a relatively poor cash endowment. 
Therefore, a limited credit market may result in a limited 
outmigration from cropping and, therefore, land markets are limited 
from the supply side. Labor markets may depend on credit markets 
almost in the same way as land markets. The average landholding is 
very small. Most households do not have enough land to farm. 
Therefore, unless a household rents in additional land from households 
moving out of cropping or has its own major labor force moving out of 
cropping, it will not hire workers for agricultural work. Hence, no 
matter if labor is hired for agriculture or non-agriculture, labor 
markets will be thin if nonfarm and noncrop job opportunities are 
limited by credit markets. 
If the government changes its position on lenders' rights in the 
case of default, it is predictable that the supply of credit will 
increase and interest rates will reduce. The opportunity for 
profitable business outside cropping will thus expand. The threshold 
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for outmigration from the crop sector becomes easier to overcome. As a 
consequence, the scopes of outmigration from cropping, land markets, 
and labor markets, and the possibility of resource allocation through 
factor markets will all increase. Nevertheless, the government may 
have to tolerate the emergence of a landless population. If lenders' 
right is protected by the government, then among other things, the use 
right of a piece of land for 15 years will become acceptable as 
collateral. Since foreclosure implies loss of access to land, 
protection of lenders' right may lead to some households becoming 
landless. At present, the government does not seem to be willing to 
undertake a policy with such consequences. However, rent, hired labor, 
and interest were all not acceptable to policy makers a few years ago; 
they are all legal now. Therefore, it is not unimaginable that in a 
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TABLE lA 
LAND ENDOWMENT IN EACH PROVINCE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Province Labor Cult. Land- % of Area Multiple Effective 
Land Labor Irrigated Cropping Land-Labor 
Ratio Index Ratio 
Guizhou 10,087 28,480 2.8 24 153 3.8 
Sichuan 38,712 98,109 2.5 47 181 3.9 
Zheijiang 14,030 27,249 1. 9 84 252 4.0 
Yunnan 12,808 42,488 3.3 34 140 4.3 
Guangdong 19,061 47,130 2.5 65 200 4.4 
Guangxi 13,963 39,301 2.8 54 177 4.4 
Fuj iang 7,083 19,240 2.7 64 189 4.5 
Tibet 825 3,437 4.2 53 93 4.6 
Hunan 20,239 50,998 2.5 82 218 4.8 
Henan 25,370 106,508 4.2 45 160 4.9 
Shanghai 2,071 5,249 2.5 98 218 4.9 
Anhui 17,478 66,518 3.8 so 177 5.9 
Jiangsu 20,068 69,451 3.5 75 184 5.9 
Shandong 24,988 107,728 4.3 63 146 6.1 
Hubei 14,572 55,481 3.8 63 200 6.6 
Tianjing 1,391 6,879 4.9 67 133 6.7 
Beijing 1,372 6,343 4.6 81 151 6.9 
Hebei 17,481 98,551 5.6 54 131 7.3 
Jiangxi 9,305 35,753 3.8 74 229 7.4 
Shaanxi 9,124 56,377 6.2 33 127 7.6 
Qinhai 1,104 8,640 7.8 27 87 7.7 
Liaoning 6,488 54,814 8.4 19 102 8.9 
Gansu 5,841 53,425 9.1 24 98 9.5 
Shanxi 6,647 58,076 8.7 28 107 9.6 
Ningxia 1,061 12,605 11.9 28 101 12.8 
I.Mongolia 4,657 75,974 16.3 20 91 16.3 
Jinin 3,845 60,895 15.6 18 100 16.3 
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(Table lA--continue) 
Xingjiang 2,570 47,422 18.5 83 92 21.4 
Heilongjiang4,110 131,273 31.9 7 98 32.1 
SOURCE: China Agriculture Yearbook 1984. 
NOTE: (1) Agricultural labor force excluding workers in village­
run industry, unit= 1,000 workers; 
(2) cultivated land unit= 1,000 mu; 
(3) col.2/col.l; 
(4) % of cultivated land irrigated; 
(5) unit=%; 
(6) effective land-labor ratio is the land-labor ratio adjusted for 
irrigation and multiple cropping; its formula is: effective land-
labor ratio= Land-labor ratio x (1 +%of area irrigated/4) x (1 
+( Multiple cropping index- 100)/2). See A. M. Tang, An Analytical 
and Empirical Investigation of Agriculture in Mainland China 1952-
1980 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984) for the 
rationale of these adjustments. 
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TABLE lB 
LAND ENDOWMENT IN EACH PREFECTURE, ANHUI PROVINCE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Prefecture Labor Cult. Land- % of Area Multiple Effective 
Land Labor Irrigated Cropping Land-Labor 
Ratio Index Ratio 
Anqing 85 126 1.5 88 215 2.9 
Huizho 705 1,192 1. 7 76 248 3.5 
Anqing 2,094 4,859 2.3 66 211 4.2 
Tongling 124 297 2.4 95 200 4.5 
Wuhu 697 1,736 2.5 77 224 4.7 
Maanshan 297 756 2.5 93 225 5.0 
Chaohu 1,527 4,355 2.9 80 199 5.2 
Liuan 2,004 6,706 3.3 68 171 5.2 
Fuyang 4,363 16,915 3.9 24 166 5.5 
Xuancheng 764 2,246 2.9 65 222 5.6 
Hefei 1,172 4,183 3.6 72 172 5.7 
Huainan 390 1,522 3.9 57 174 6.1 
Suxian 1,669 7,913 4.7 29 158 6.5 
Huaibei 416 2,208 5.3 11 160 7.1 
Chuxian 1,297 6,250 4.8 68 165 7.4 
Bangbu 844 4,542 5.4 47 162 7.9 
SOURCE: Statistical Bureau, Anhui Province. 
NOTE: Definitions and units are the same as in Table lA, except 
labor force here includes workers in village-run industry. 
Data are for 1983. 
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Table 2 
SCOPE OF LAND TRANSACTIONS IN SOME AREAS 
Household involved (%) Land involved (%) 
Xiapu County 4 2.6 
Fujiang Provincea 
Ezhoushi 5 3 
Hubei Provinceb 
Huangni Township 12.2 3.3 
Chuzhou, Anhui Provincec 
Zhongwei County 0.058 0.025 
Ningxia Provinced 
Tianjine 8.3 
SOURCE: a: Fan, Genxing. "A Survey of the Approaches Used in 
Recontracting Land," Fujiang luntan, 7 (1984): 45-46. 
b: Wang, Xinglong. "On Current Stage of Land 
Recontracting in Rural Areas," Hongqi, 8 (1984): 24-28. 
c: Hou, Changmin and Dou, Tanghou. "Permitting Land 
Transfers Is Necessary for the Development of 
Productivity in Rural Areas," Jianghuai luntan, 4 
(1984): 5-10. 
d: Wei, Nong. "A Survey of the Concentration of Land to 
the Farming Expert in Zhongwei County," Ningxia 
shehuikexue, 1 (1985): 84-86. 
e: Agricultural Department, Communist Party of China, 
Tianjin. "A Survey of the Situation in the 
Concentration of Land," China Agriculture Yearbook, 
1985 : 409-11. 
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Table 3 
LABOR-HIRING IN WU COUNTY AND YANGSHI COUNTY 
No. of household No. of workers hired(%) 
Wu County-5! 
Total 356 2073 (100) 
Civil engineering 145 842 (40.6) 
Manufacturing 112 651 (31.4) 
Retailing 52 303 (14.6) 
Stock-raising 8 52 (2.5) 
or farming 
Transportation, 39 225 (10.9) 
fish-raising, and others 
Yangshi Countyb 
Total 105 970 (100) 
Civil Engineering 5 277 (29.9) 
Manufacturing 27 143 (14.7) 
Retailing 6 19 (2) 
Farming 48 439 (46) 
Transportation 19 92 (18) 
SOURCE: a: Zhang, Songmao. "A Study of Labor-hiring in Rural 
Areas," Jianghai xuekan, 5(1985): 42-44. 
b: Gao, Xuechen and Lu, Guozhi. "Adhering to the 
Orientation of Socialist, Cooperative Economy and 
Actively Guiding A Healthy Development of All Forms of 
Economies," Nongye jingji (Shenyang) 5 (1985): 15-20. 
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Table 4 
A SURVEY OF CASH EXPENDITURE AND TYPES OF CREDIT 
County Households Cash Expenditure Credit 
Surveyed on Inputs (Yuan) Bank and Credit Private 
Cooperative 
Niujia 10 8,367 2,056 2,880 
Chonghe 10 5,241 35 2,050 
SOURCE: Zhang Zhiping, "A Survey of the Rural Private Credits in 
Wuchang County, Heilongjiang Province," Jingji wenti 
tansuo 7 (1985): 40-42. 
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